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U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS AND
OPTIONS IN CENTRAL AFRICA.

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Final Report

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Dec 1977

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Technical Note
SSC-TN-6576-1

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By: Kenneth L. Adelman


Prepared for:

Office, Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20301

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**Richard B. Foster, Director
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The findings of this report are not to be construed as an official Department of Defense position unless so designated by other authorized documents.

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This preliminary report is in partial fulfillment of Contract MDA903-77-C-0326.

FOREWORD

Events in Central Africa are increasingly important to U.S. security interests on the continent and indeed worldwide. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (Near Eastern, Africa, and South Asian Affairs) and the Director of the African Region recognized the importance of Central Africa to U.S. national security concerns. They requested a description of recent political, economic, and military events in that region and specific policy findings for the short and medium term. This report was guided by such a request, and therefore did not present "alternative futures" for the states in the area or any other considerations of long-term perspective. The specific findings which flow out of the report are contained in Chapter V, pages 36-42.

The study was undertaken by the SRI Strategic Studies Center, under the general supervision of Mr. Richard B. Foster, Director, and Mr. Harold Silverstein, Special Assistant to the Director. The project leader was Dr. Kenneth L. Adelman, assisted by Dr. James E Dornan.

Richard B. Foster
Director
Strategic Studies Center

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I INTRODUCTION: THE REGION'S IMPORTANCE

Africa is of increasing economic, political and strategic importance to the United States and our principal allies; along with the Middle East, it is among the most volatile areas in the world today. The Central African states of Zaire, Angola and Zambia are a crossroads for the continent and a microcosm of ideological, economic, political, and international factors found throughout Africa.

The region's importance stems from the following elements:

- Geographically. The three states along with Tanzania constitute a belt separating the volatile southern area from the remainder of sub-Saharan Africa.
- Natural resources. The region possesses a wealth of minerals--particularly copper, cobalt, and oil--which will prove increasingly important to the U.S. and NATO allies in the decades ahead.
- Ideologically. It encompasses the full spectrum within Africa: Zaire being capitalistic with free enterprise, Angola adopting "Marxism-Leninism" and "scientific socialism," and Zambia proclaiming "African socialism".
- Politically. The region spans the gamut: Zaire pro-Western, traditionally tied to the United States and staunchly anti-Soviet; Angola tied to the Soviet Union and almost entirely dependent on Cuba; and Zambia formerly close to the West and now preferring some policies advocated by the Soviets and Cubans.
- Economically. The region has vast potential wealth but serious poverty and grave economic difficulties at present.
- Regionally. All three are economically dependent on one another (particularly Zaire and Zambia on Angola), suspicious and unfriendly to one another, and presently in a time of drastic domestic change and political readjustment.

U.S. short-range interests in the area--as throughout the continent--center on promoting regional peace (endangered by the Katangan Invasion of Zaire in March 1977); protecting American citizens (some 3,800 in the three states); protecting U.S. investment (totaling about \$830 million); insuring access to and through the region, particularly for contingencies within and beyond Africa; and limiting Soviet facilities and access in the region (already substantial in Angola and Congo-Brazzaville, and increasing in Zambia). From a long-range perspective, the United States seeks to help the evolution of stable, open political systems in Africa; to maintain access to the vast mineral resources; to demonstrate its capacity as an effective and reliable ally (particularly as an alternative to the Soviet Union); and to bolster support for its views on major international issues (important since Africa provides approximately one-third of UN membership).

The United States has traditionally supported African solutions to the continent's problems and limited outside interference by Big Powers. Such goals were of course violated during the Angolan Civil War by the massive Soviet intervention and introduction of Cuban troops.

II EACH STATE IN BRIEF

A. Zaire

1. Security

Zaire, surrounded by nine different states and with a coastline extending only 23 miles, is vulnerable to outside attacks. Angola poses the clearest danger for several reasons. Zaire's longest border is with Angola and most of its infrastructure, industry and copper mines, lie close to this border. In addition, Angola controls Zaire's two main transportation links with the outside world: the Benguela Railroad and the mouth of the river with Zaire's two major ports.

Antagonism has existed between Zaire's President Mobutu and Angola's President Agostinho Neto since Zaire strongly backed the FNLA during the 1975 Angolan War, and continued to assist FNLA, UNITA and FLEC (fighting for the "liberation" of the oil enclave Cabinda) after Neto assumed power. In February 1976, Zaire and Angola signed an accord to normalize relations, with Mobutu allegedly agreeing to stop assistance to the three opposition groups in Angola and Neto reportedly agreeing to return the Katangan refugees (who fled Zaire in the early 1960s, had lived in Angola and fought with the MPLA). Nothing resulted from these accords, and relations between the neighboring states worsened.

On 8 March 1977, some 2,000 Katangans crossed from Angola into the Shaba Region--Zaire's economic heartland which supplies 70 percent of its foreign exchange. The invaders intended to topple the Mobutu regime, already unsteady because of a deteriorating economy. They were backed by an amalgamation of some 15 diverse groups, united only in their opposition to Mobutu, who met in the Soviet Embassy in Paris as the conflict began. Angola provided logistical support and allowed the invaders to march into

Shaba, armed with Soviet equipment and trained in part by Cuban advisors. Militarily, the invasion was surprisingly successful as the Zairian Army (F.A.Z.) put up little resistance. The Katangans advanced, at times to a welcoming but more often to an apathetic population of fellow tribesmen.

From a politico-military perspective, however, the invasion failed. The Katangans overestimated the degree of popular support they would receive. The group, under General Mbumba's leadership, offered no real program or ideology to gain backing, other than the overthrow of Mobutu (probably because they had none). The villagers lent passive cooperation as many feared later retaliation by the Zairian Army.

The invaders clearly underestimated President Mobutu's political acumen, which more than compensated for his Army's incompetence. The President knew the most effective way of portraying the attack in order to gain international support and the most effective means of securing such assistance. Rather than relying upon international organizations, either the OAU or the UN, he dispatched personal emissaries to states including Morocco and France whose international or domestic situation inclined them to lend a helping hand.

Mobutu's diplomatic position was strong as the Katangans committed the two cardinal sins of modern African ethics by violating international borders and arming refugees to fight against a homeland. Today, 20 other African states face armed refugees seeking to return home and overthrow the government.

Zaire first requested assistance from the United States, but the new Administration chose to emphasize a diplomatic solution under Nigerian auspices, which turned out to be futile. President Carter stated on 25 April 1977, "We have an aversion to military involvement in foreign countries," and Congressional leaders remained skeptical after the Vietnam, CIA and Angolan War controversies. Hence, the U.S. Government only dispatched nonlethal equipment previously promised to Kinshasa.

The Belgians likewise sent limited assistance and the Egyptians offered some pilots. The Moroccans, however, offered 1,500 elite troops--combat-experienced from battling guerrillas seeking a Marxist state in the former Spanish Sahara. France provided the necessary air transportation. President Giscard acted from a combination of internal political concerns (being attacked for indecisiveness by the opposition), economic considerations (French businesses have long desired greater access into Zaire's potential wealth), and his basic African policy--to extend French influence throughout the continent but particularly in the French-speaking nations. In addition, France's principal African allies of Ivory Coast and Senegal had become increasingly fearful of the West's inaction in dealing with Soviet-Cuban advances on the continent. Their pressure on Paris may have proved decisive.

The Moroccan troops arrived in time to prevent an attack on Kolwezi at the center of Shaba's wealth, and finally repelled the invaders. President Mobutu had thus pulled off a miracle of turning a perilous situation into major victory.

Since the Invasion, the President has addressed the obvious shortcomings in his own forces. On 1 July 1977, he said that the Army suffered a moral defeat due, not to bad soldiers, but to bad leaders. Consequently, he assumed direct control of the Army, dismissed his Chief of Staff (General Bumba), retired 30 to 40 high-ranking generals and colonels, and ordered a total reorganization of the forces. French and Belgian officers are now working to restructure the F.A.Z. command and to make it leaner and more effective in combat. The Army, which received new uniforms and equipment during the Invasion, will receive additional assistance from the Belgians, French, Chinese, and the United States. The Administration has requested \$30 million in FMS credit for FY 1978 to be used, in part, to improve mobility and communications, replenish supplies, and provide ground force equipment. Zaire itself may increase defense spending, which has been held at less than 15 percent of its government budget.

Despite improvements in equipment, structure, and command, however, it is questionable whether Zaire could itself repel another invasion of similar magnitude. Its Army has had a dismal performance record since Independence in 1960. It now suffers from a vast array of equipment made in the U.S., Belgium, Italy, France, Israel, China and North Korea, and from undisciplined, untrained, and largely unmotivated forces. Zaire would almost have to rely upon international assistance to repel a large invasion during the foreseeable future. Such assistance would be more difficult to arrange should the attack be a guerrilla rather than conventional one.

2. Economics

A combination of factors pushed the country to the brink of international bankruptcy and the regime to the brink of disaster. A recurrence of the experience in Nkrumah's Ghana almost occurred before the Kipshasa government took drastic actions.

The economic picture can be presented briefly: (a) after a respectable 6 percent average GDP growth during 1969-74, Zaire has averaged a negative growth rate of 4-5 percent since 1975; (b) its balance of payments was in deficit an unprecedented \$537 million in 1975 (equal to 55 percent of all exports) and another \$156 million in 1976; since official foreign reserves were depleted in 1974, both 1975 and 1976 deficits were financed by default in payments and IMF loans; (c) its inflation rate was over 100 percent in late 1975 and consumer prices rose 80 percent in 1976; and (d) the government's debt equaled over one-third of its expenditures and 12 percent of its total GDP in 1976.

Zaire's economy suffered from international changes and internal mismanagement. Internationally, the price of copper—which accounts for over two-thirds of Zaire's foreign exchange—plummeted from a high of \$1.40 per pound in April 1974 to a low of 55 cents per pound in December 1975. Zaire's copper revenue for 1975 was less than half that for 1973.

Its copper production fell by 8 percent in 1976. The closing of the Benguela Railroad in Angola forced the use of alternative routes through Zambia, Rhodesia, and South Africa. During recent years the price of oil and other minerals for Zaire has of course increased substantially.

Domestically, the government made several basic mistakes. In November 1973, Mobutu "Zairianized" all foreign-owned agriculture, transportation, and commercial enterprises. In late 1974, he "radicalized" the economy, nationalizing all enterprises exceeding \$2 million in turnover. Plantations and businesses were handed over to party loyalists, who often managed them poorly, sold the existing stock, and failed to reorder. The government misallocated its scarce foreign exchange by building prestige projects and spending on luxury items.

The government is now amending for past sins. In the spring of 1976, after Zaire had defaulted on loan principal and interest for more than a year, the government acted on several fronts:

- The President reversed his decisions to "Zairianize" and "radicalize" the economy. He urged expatriates to return and own their former plantations and businesses. This move was designed to spur the economy and lead to a resumption of traditional trade credits and capital inflows.
- In March 1976 the President agreed to an IMF stabilization program designed to correct external disequilibrium over the medium term and reduce balance-of-payments deficits and payment arrears. The government adopted restricted financial policies: holding Treasury expenditures stable, increasing tax revenues, limiting domestic expansion of bank credit, and renegotiating external debt. The details of the IMF package are quite elaborate, but suffice it to say that through the program, Zaire has cleared all arrears, made its payments on time and established a National Debt Management Office to ensure responsible action in the future. In return, international banks recently agreed to loan the Bank of Zaire another \$250 million, contingent upon good performance. Economically, the government's financial position did not suffer greatly from the Katangan Invasion since the amount of extra international assistance exceeded that spent by Zaire on the invasion.

- In July 1977, President Mobutu established a Department of Rural Development to help alleviate poverty for the 80 percent of Zairians living in rural areas. He urged decentralization of industry and self-sufficiency for each region and proclaimed agriculture the government's top priority.

The economic outlook for Zaire nonetheless remains bleak. While rescued from international bankruptcy, the country will continue in dire economic straits for the years ahead. Prospects for the price of copper, on which the economy runs, are not promising. World demand continues to stagnate as the Western economic recovery is more gradual than anticipated. Copper stockpiles remain large at approximately 2 million tons, and miniaturization of equipment lowers overall copper demand. Zaire's use of the Benguela Railroad is most improbable over the medium range. Should wide-scale civil war erupt in Rhodesia, as many expect, Zaire will suffer even further since over one-third of its copper presently transits Rhodesia and since nearly all imports for Shaba (e.g., maize, coke, coal, and sulfur products) come directly from Rhodesia or through Rhodesia from South Africa. Zaire also must spend nearly one-third of its government budget to service foreign debts.

3. Political

Whatever serious opposition to Mobutu existed before the Katangan Invasion has dissipated since his "victory". Mobutu emerged from the crisis stronger politically than at any time since taking office on 24 November 1965.

The Invasion, like any such crisis, revealed the strengths and weaknesses of the regime. It showed that despite many domestic misgivings concerning his policies (particularly on the economy), there was no viable or popular alternative. His external opponents were shown to be, as he later stated, "rotting corpses of the 1960s" and his external opponents--presuming they existed and had some power--could not coalesce around any single individual or group. In essence, the Invasion was most important politically in what did not occur: a genuine opposition force to make its move when the regime was most vulnerable.

Since the Invasion, the President has consolidated his power to a greater extent. Changes in the military were matched by a wholesale political reshuffling. The Governor of the Central Bank was dismissed. The Foreign Minister, Mobutu's long and close associate, and his uncle, Chief of the Lunda Tribe in the Shaba, were arrested for treason and sentenced to death. The Governor of Shaba was sentenced to death. Various minor officials were dismissed and some arrested.

The President has promised to institute democratic reforms, with some members of the Political Bureau elected directly by the people. He also pledged to improve human rights by ending police and soldier brutality against villagers.

It remains to be seen if such reforms are in fact instituted. It seems evident, however, that President Mobutu has assured his own unequalled position as leader in Zaire for the indefinite future.

Because no alternative visibly surfaced last spring, during the regime's most vulnerable period, one can only guess at any successor to Mobutu. A successful coup would almost have to come from within the army by Western-educated and Western-leaning officers. While possibly more determined to help alleviate the economic and social hardships over the long run, such a successor would be forced to consolidate his power and maintain internal order in the short run. Zaire remains potentially volatile, despite the decade of order the present government has provided. A recurrence of the chaos of the country's first half decade could plunder its already discouraging development prospects. Any Zairian leader--Mobutu or a replacement--would still face the severe financial constraints imposed by past mismanagement, irresponsible spending, and decline in copper prices. With the recent series of purges, few attractive and capable individuals remain within reach of the top position. Those in exile seem detached from any internal ties or support, as seen during the Invasion.

4. International

Zaire has traditionally been close to the United States. Its leaders appreciate U.S. efforts in the early 1960s to assure the country's territorial integrity. Since then, the United States has poured approximately \$500 million in assistance for development and security. Total U.S. investment in Zaire--just under \$1 billion--is exceeded on the continent only by Nigeria and South Africa.

Zaire supplies approximately four-fifths of U.S. imports of cobalt, a key material in making steel. It produces two-thirds of the entire Free World supply of cobalt and half its industrial diamonds. Diplomatically, Zaire has promoted moderate stances; for example, it dissuaded the OAU from advocating the expulsion of Israel from the United Nations, when this was a real possibility, and led the movement for a coalition government in Angola. In various international fora debating North-South issues, Zaire continues to be a moderate and friendly spokesman.

U.S.-Zairian relations plummeted during the Katangan Invasion. For months afterward, President Mobutu expressed disappointment over Washington's limited assistance. In an interview with Newsweek on 18 April 1977, he said, "I confess we are bitterly disappointed by America's attitude. Neto is a pawn of the Cubans and the Russians, but you won't face up to the threat. It is your weakness versus their willpower and strength." More recently, however, he has reduced the criticism and stated that all was forgiven if not forgotten.

Zaire's relations with Western Europe correspondingly soared during the crisis. For a rather limited operation, France received wide acclaim by moderate Africans throughout the continent. Zaire's ties with Belgium, traditionally a love-hate relationship, also improved. Such feelings of new and reinvigorated friendships are supported by economic dealings. Zaire sends nearly four-fifths of its exports to Western Europe (v. 6 percent to the U.S.) and receives over three-fifths of its imports from Europe (v. 17 percent from the U.S.).

Zaire has retained a cordial relationship with China since Mobutu's 1973 trip to Peking. Still the government realizes that China is unable to provide assistance when really needed, as seen during the Angolan Civil War when they departed just as the fighting began.

President Mobutu is staunchly anti-Soviet as he remembers how the Soviets attempted to subvert him in the 1960s even prior to the Katangan Invasion. Some of his anti-Moscow rhetoric may be for public relations benefits of bolstering Western and Arab support. Still much of it is sincere. During his 28 May 1977 victory address, Mobutu spent his wrath on the Soviets, and to a lesser extent the Cubans; the Angolans and Katangans themselves were mentioned as pawns only in passing.

5. Prospects

Politically, Zaire is relatively stable under Mobutu's firm control. While the President has proposed some important political reforms, his top priority is to secure unchallengeable power. The recent purges removed some of the most talented and reform-minded in the upper echelons of government.

Zaire's economic situation will continue to stagnate with severe financial constraints, high inflation, slow or negative growth, and staggering international debt. The military situation remains precarious as the Katangans sit just across the border. Only one-third of its members--2,000 out of 6,000--actually entered Zaire last spring. The group is even stronger today as its minimal war losses were more than compensated by hundreds of new recruits.

The Katangans may well attempt another large-scale invasion within the year. They may probe with limited guerrilla operations, as they did last summer. A prolonged battle could disrupt Zaire's copper production and transportation, weary its ineffective Army, and dampen the prospects of foreign troop presence. To meet this challenge, Zaire is bolstering

its own forces. It could also supply arms and support to UNITA, the main resistance group in Angola. This move could force Neto to concentrate more on stability within Angola and possibly prevent him from supplying logistical support to the Katangans. Kinshasa's assistance to UNITA would have to be covert and carefully handled. Otherwise, Luanda would realize the move and retaliate by providing more supplies and unleashing the Katangans to the degree it determines their moves.

Congressional skepticism over Zaire's stability and competence to handle its economic affairs may have dissipated somewhat, even though the Kinshasa regime remains one of the least popular on Capitol Hill. Those in the House and Senate dealing with African affairs often consider Mobutu personally ostentatious, his regime totally corrupt, his military impotent, his human rights record dismal, and his development efforts weak and insincere. While political, economic, or military conditions in Zaire are not worse than elsewhere in Africa, they are under closer scrutiny by American lawmakers who have voted considerable appropriations for the regime over the years. With the fall of Haile Selassie, Mobutu remains America's longest and closest associate in black Africa (though Kenyatta has recently become a favorite in Washington). Mobutu's inability to speak English and the country's exclusion from an African bloc--such as Commonwealth nations, those in the French monetary system, or former Portuguese colonies--do not help his image in Washington or on the continent.

At present, Kinshasa and Washington have joint interest in implementing the IMF stabilization program; training and equipping the Army to repel another invasion; limiting the expansion of Soviet and Cuban influence and presence on the continent; and seeking rather moderate and African solutions to Africa's problems.

B. Angola

1. Security

Angola is surrounded by four states and has a vast coastline. None of the neighboring states poses a direct security threat. The government of President Agostinho Neto faces internal rebellion throughout the country--in the forested northwest by FNLA, in the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda by FLEC, and in the arid southwest by UNITA.

Because such forces have continued the battle with growing effectiveness in many cases, Cuba increased its occupation forces in 1977 by some 5,000 troops (present State Dept. estimates: 14,000 to 19,000). While the numbers are up, the Cubans' morale is reportedly down. The romantic and rapid victory of the Civil War has deteriorated into endless counter-insurgency. The Cubans are now operating against the very type of rural, popular guerrilla "liberation" troops which Castro and Che Guevara glamorized in past years. Cuban troops have taken the defensive, merely holding the cities and refusing to attempt to secure rural areas.

The greatest threat to the Neto regime comes from UNITA, which claims to hold one-third of the country with its 20,000 guerrillas (v. 3,000 in 1974, but all such figures must be taken very loosely). UNITA claims to have killed over 1,000 Cubans and to have discouraged their taking offensive actions in 1977. The last Cuban offensive in 1976 showed UNITA to have competent leadership under Jonas Savimbi and well-trained troops. Another such offensive is unlikely in the foreseeable future. The Cubans do have logistical and morale problems and do face popular hostility. The UNITA resistance will therefore continue or even increase in the foreseeable future.

UNITA has disrupted the country's transportation network as it controls much of the Benguela Railroad line. It has also disrupted food transportation and production; this it can do effectively as it controls

Angola's grain-growing area. Due to recent gains and his two-year durability in opposing the Luanda regime, Savimbi no longer seems anxious to negotiate with Neto. He considers time on his side with the Cubans tiring of their occupational role and Angolans increasingly tiring of the Cubans.

2. Economics

Reports from Angola paint a dismal picture of food shortages and riots in Luanda. Most crops, including coffee, are no longer even being planted in significant quantities to provide an important crop. The Cubans are reported to be sending their fish catches back to Havana; this neither alleviates the situation nor warms relations with Angolans. Cuban and Bulgarian agricultural experts are working to increase production but no progress is apparent. Throughout Angola, medical services are scarce, malnutrition epidemic, and the school system crippled with only 1 percent of secondary school teachers currently in place. The suspension of the Benguela Railroad has stopped most commercial activities and resulted in a \$30 million annual loss for the government.

Ironically, Angola's economy is now almost exclusively dependent upon Cabindan oil exploited by Gulf Company. In 1976, oil exports accounted for four-fifths of Angola's export earnings and three-fifths of the government's revenues; figures for 1977 will be higher. Gulf recently signed a new agreement with Luanda, and hence prospects are that this relationship will continue. Angola uses these oil funds to pay for the bulk of its imported foodstuffs, equipment and general consumer goods. Without Gulf's continued production, the regime would be even more desperate since domestic exploitation of minerals (iron ore, manganese) and diamonds is severely limited and domestic agriculture (coffee and sugar) all but reduced to minimal subsistence plots.

3. Political

Resentment against Neto, never a charismatic or very appealing individual, has risen due to such economic hardships, mounting rural guerrilla conflict and even urban terrorism, increasing reliance upon unpopular foreign troops, and a growing belief that the government is not representative.

Angola, it has been said, is led by a political minority dominated by a racial minority. Neto himself is mulatto (mestico), married to a white Portuguese, and speaks no African dialect. In terms of education, customs, and language, he is a brown Portuguese. His government includes high-ranking whites (e.g., Foreign Minister) and is filled with assimilados (Portuguese cultured). A list of top-ranking Angolans contains few African names. During time of crisis, Neto sends his family to Portugal, where the families of the Defense Minister, Finance Minister, UN Ambassador and other top officials permanently reside.

Ideologically, the government is striving to foist a rather alien belief system on Africans and may be having a difficult time of it. The Central Committee has scheduled a Congress for November to transform the MPLA into a "Marxist-Leninist party," as Frelimo of Mozambique did last year. The Committee explicitly rejects the notion of "African socialism" and is determined to institute "scientific socialism." There is no wide-scale popular support for such ideological purity. In August 1977 the Central Committee saw the need to increase its indoctrination program by establishing a Department of Internal Education to "promote more coordinated and intensive action in the political and ideological training of militants."

These political, economic, ideological and racial problems in Angola surged to the surface on 27 May 1977 when former Interior Minister Neto Alves and former Army Commissar Jose van Dunem attempted to overthrow Neto. The rebels emphasized their ties to the poor, illiterate blacks

in the city slums and Neto's ties to the affluent, educated mesticos in the more wealthy districts. Alves' strongly pro-Soviet sentiments seemed to have played little role in mustering support for his movement. It is difficult to imagine the elderly and rather cautious Kremlin leaders fully supporting such a charismatic, revolutionary, and rather flamboyant leader as Alves.

In any case, the Soviets took no overt part in the coup attempt. The Cubans delayed a few hours--perhaps contacting Havana for instructions--and then acted quickly and massively to back Neto. They forced themselves in the Luanda radio station and regained control of the airport, port, government buildings, and major transportation points. They provided bodyguards for Neto and his top cohorts. Without this dramatic Cuban action, Neto could not have survived in office. His domestic support, from all but his closest associates, had dried up.

4. International

The Cubans' rescue operation symbolizes the dilemma of Angola: without their help, the Neto government would have fallen, yet with their assistance, popular resentment rises which necessitates even more force to stay in power. Relations between the Angolans and Cubans became strained during the war when the Angolans considered the Cubans racist and clannish, while the Cubans considered the Angolans pitiful fighters and cowardly. Resentments have built up since Cuban troops keep separate from the people.

Angola's relations with the Soviet Union, despite tensions arising during the coup attempt, remain friendly. President Neto and his top assistants met in Havana with Brezhnev and Kosygin last month (September 1977) to "consolidate the friendship" between the two states. This follows the October 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in which they pledged, among other things, to "continue to develop cooperation in the military sphere."

The Soviets train Angolan military and intelligence officers in Luanda and Moscow. There are currently about 100 Soviets training the secret police, called DISA or the Angolan Information and Security Directorate. Moscow is of course the primary source of military assistance, providing approximately 85 modern tanks of the type employed in the Warsaw Pact, 33 MIG-17s and MIG-21s, and limited air defense equipment.

Soviet influence is furthered by economic as well as military assistance, and by the increasing Marxist indoctrination within Angola. High-level officials are known to be firmly pro-Soviet, including First Deputy Prime Minister Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who helped secure Soviet arms during the civil war.

Still the Neto government has not allowed Soviet bases. In fact, it adopted a constitution explicitly prohibiting the "installation of foreign military bases on national territory." There is little indication that the Soviets have pushed hard for such bases. Most likely they learned a lesson in Mozambique, where they antagonized the new government with heavy-handed insistence on port facilities; it took months and a victory in the Angolan War to heal this breach.

The Soviet Union now concentrates more on maintaining friendly relations and close military ties; these are considered crucial to secure important military rights in time of need. During the Angolan War many African states--including Algeria, Mali, Benin, and Congo-Brazzaville--provided crucial facilities for the successful Soviet airlift, though none have permanent Soviet bases.

American strategists and planners realize the importance of such military rights. This cooperation by friendly states in permitting the use of air and port facilities furthers Soviet projection of power in time of need. The degree and nature of such cooperation is difficult for outsiders to evaluate, however; it is a matter of degree and somewhat scenario-dependent whereas the presence or absence of established bases is more easily detectable.

At present, Angola would be most inclined to offer limited-duration military access for Soviet projection of power. Should Luanda prove reluctant during a crisis, the Kremlin could apply indirect pressure through Havana which certainly could arrange for the Soviets to use Angolan air and port facilities. This could prove important for Moscow to increase the following:

- Soviet aerial and surface surveillance of Western presence in the South Atlantic;
- Soviet access to the Namibian border should independence not be granted in 1978, SWAPO be totally excluded, or some other development occur which creates a border conflict against the territory's rulers;
- Soviet access into Namibia after independence, should the new regime prove hostile to South Africa and passively or actively permit guerrilla activity against the Republic itself; and
- Soviet ability to threaten the interruption of Western oil during a time of crisis. This "chokepoint"--with the flow of over 80 percent of European NATO's oil and 75 percent of all of NATO's strategic material taking place 480 miles off the Angolan border--is frequently overemphasized for three reasons: (1) an unprovoked attack on Western shipping would constitute a casus belli, as the Kremlin realizes; (2) more convenient areas of vulnerability exist around the Persian Gulf, within air-reach of the Soviet homeland rather than 6,000 miles away; and (3) during a European or worldwide conflict few resources would be expended in southern Africa; the primary battle would take place elsewhere. Still the "chokepoint" argument has some merit, as Western strategists seek to minimize areas in which pressure could effectively be applied between times of total peace and full-scale conflict.

Angola's relations with the United States remain distant, as they have since Independence. Neto clearly wants U.S. recognition. Americans favoring this move consider it consistent with the Administration's inclinations to open communications to all regimes regardless of ideology and with the traditional distinction between conferring (a) full diplomatic relations and (b) moral or political acceptance of a regime's ideology or style of rule. Many also consider it helpful in bolstering moderate Angolans who otherwise have no choice but to rely upon the Soviets, Cubans, and their allies for assistance and guidance.

Opponents of recognition contend that an independent Angola should be recognized when Angola is in fact independent. At present, it is basically an occupied territory, with foreigners running the police, army, main administrative agencies, ports, and factories. As long as UNITA and other groups are actively struggling for a coalition government--one representative of the entire country rather than a small segment of primarily urban mulattos--the United States should resist undermining their cause through recognition. Some moderate African regimes and traditionally friendly states like Zaire would look askance at Washington's opening full diplomatic relations with Angola. Senegalese President Leopold Senghor has said that the "Soviet-Cuban expedition in Angola and the placing in power of a minority liberation movement created a grave situation in Africa, threatening the independence of each African state."

5. Prospects

Angola will long remain an important country in Africa, perhaps the key country in Central Africa. It sits astride vital shipping lanes, has excellent ports and airfields, has a developed inland transportation network, and is rich in minerals (oil, iron ore, diamonds, manganese). It is rather self-sufficient but has neighbors (Zaire and Zambia) who depend heavily on its railroads and ports for their economic prosperity.

Still the country is in a state of internal disarray and instability. Neto's support is dwindling, his leadership increasingly under attack. Even before Independence, he displayed ideological rigidity and an inability to accommodate opponents which led to continual divisions within the MPLA. His political skills have not improved. Besides, his health may be failing, with reports of hepatitis and a serious heart condition.

Neto's leadership seems but a tentative one. Some drastic change appears inevitable within the next year or two, brought about by a successful coup, UNITA or other opposition group (FNLA, FLEC) gains, c

dwindling Cuban support. A new regime may be worse from our perspective, as Alves would have been, or may be better, as Savimbi would be. A successor may not prove as rigid as Neto. He would most probably lack Neto's personal determination to resist broadening the base of his government by including elements of UNITA and perhaps even the FNLA.

While Savimbi can aggravate the regime's already substantial problems, he will not be able to take over the government in the foreseeable future. A more probable successor to Neto would be another pro-Soviet, pro-Cuban leader with more black (as opposed to mulatto) support. No coup could be successful without passive or active cooperation from the Cubans, as seen by the events of last May. Hence, no staunchly pro-West leadership (more common within FNLA or UNITA) would be allowed to triumph by itself. Still the Cubans may be growing weary of their rather awkward role and become inclined to have a more accommodating, popularly supported but still ideologically committed leader.

C. Zambia

1. Security

Zambia is landlocked and surrounded by eight states with white-ruled Rhodesia constituting the greatest threat at present. Zambia has allowed the guerrilla forces of the Patriotic Front (mostly ZANU) to operate across its 480-mile border with Rhodesia. Consequently it has faced retaliatory actions of Rhodesian air strikes, particularly around the border area of Feira. On 16 May 1977, President Kenneth Kaunda declared a "state of war," saying he had "already directed all my boys to shoot any Rhodesian planes on sight using Zambian airspace." Zambia allows the Front to be based on its territory; permits transit for arms to the liberation group; and donates training and camp facilities. However, Zambia has not itself given troops, arms, or training to the Front. Kaunda has been most reluctant to become more deeply involved due to

Zambia's limited military force, current economic hardships, and its continued dependence upon the hydroelectric power of Rhodesia's Kariba Dam to operate its essential copper mines.

At present, Zambia's army is being reorganized under new leadership. This is related more to internal policies than to any external security threats.

2. Economic

Zambia is economically important throughout the area. It is a key source of manufactured goods for Botswana, Mozambique, and Malawi. It has key rail links to Angola, Tanzania, Malawi, and Rhodesia (now closed); an oil pipeline to the Zairian copperbelt; and decent roads into Botswana, Malawi, and Mozambique.

At present, the country has serious economic problems though not as grave as in Zaire or Angola. Its economic decline is due to the drop in world copper prices and disruption of transportation facilities to export its copper.

Zambia is one of the world's most internationally tied economies. Copper constitutes over 90 percent of its exports; half of its revenues; one-third of its entire GNP; and 15 percent of direct employment and another third indirectly. Income from copper determines Zambia's capacity to import both capital and consumer goods. Its businesses and middle class suffer when export earnings decline. The price of copper dropped from \$1.40 per pound in April 1974 to a low of 55 cents per pound in December 1975. It averaged 64 cents per pound in 1976 and has improved by a few cents since then. The stoppage of the Benguela Railroad--formerly transporting over half of both Zambia's imports and exports--and the closing of the Rhodesian border--which deprived the middle class of the primary source of their imports (which declined by one-fourth between 1975 and

1976)--rendered further damage to Zambia's economy. The Rhodesian War has also caused thousands of refugees to enter Zambia, placing further strains.

Because of these factors and internal mismanagement, Zambia has an acute foreign exchange problem, huge budgetary deficit, and a high inflation rate (between 20 and 25 percent in 1977). The copper companies can obtain foreign exchange only for essential spare parts and expatriate salaries; their R&D projects and capital investments have been stopped.

Recently, the government has called for greater self-sufficiency, less reliance on copper, and more emphasis on agriculture. The economy is presently recovering from its nadir in 1975 as Zambia realized a trade surplus in 1976 and has increased copper production over 1975 levels. Still, economic conditions are poor, forcing Zambia to be increasingly reliant upon foreign assistance.

3. Political

President Kenneth Kaunda remains a popular and secure leader. Nonetheless, internal criticism has risen due to the economic problems and his focus on southern Africa.

Members of Zambia's middle class, increasingly upset by the decline of consumer goods, have criticized Kaunda for stopping trade with South Africa and closing the Rhodesian border. Some critics have proposed reopening the Rhodesian border but this seems unlikely in the present climate. Kaunda responded last July by blaming the country's economic ills on "laziness, corruption, dishonesty, and stupidity" of state officials. While world economic conditions did not help, he said, "We ourselves are guilty as well." He told critics advocating less focus on southern Africa, "These external issues are not as external as my critics would have us believe."

Kaunda's reputation has suffered with the failure thus far to negotiate majority rule in Rhodesia. He posed as the peacemaker when arranging the December 1974 negotiations in the railroad car bridging the Zambezi River and during the countless negotiations ever since. He has become increasingly frustrated and humiliated, as seen by his full support for the Patriotic Front, push for OAU recognition of the Front last summer, and extreme bitterness at the Smith regime which he recently called a "mad gang of political outlaws sitting across the river."

Political opposition to Kaunda is likely to remain covert until next spring or summer's national party caucus and October general elections. Kaunda is sure to win but may be challenged more forcefully than ever before. Just to assure his position, he is reshuffling the Army and the Cabinet and bringing in totally loyal but younger and inexperienced individuals. The party, despite outward unity, has always had internal factions caused in part by tribal tensions. The Tonga and Lozi of the west and south continue to fear domination by the Bembe in the north.

Should Kaunda be replaced in some manner, it is conceivable that his successor would be more eager to please the middle class and less fervent on boycotting Rhodesia and South Africa. Kaunda has devoted considerable time, effort and prestige to resolving the problems of southern Africa; a replacement would lack such personal investment and be far more eager (at least in the short run) to consolidate his position by boosting internal economic conditions--something Kaunda has too little understood and too often ignored. Despite the probability of even closer ties to the West, a successor would face problems of internal stability arising from either political and/or tribal rivalries. These could prove as serious and as disruptive in Zambia as elsewhere in Africa. The chances of a "radical" leader in Zambia of the stripe found in its neighbors of Angola or Mozambique would be small, given the nature of Zambian elites.

4. International

Traditionally Zambia has been strongly pro-Western, tied to the industrial democracies economically and maintaining warm relations within the Commonwealth. Zambia has increasing U.S. Congressional support due to Kaunda's ability as a leader and his sporadic though serious attempts to address the nation's economic ills. Recently, the Angolan War and failure to negotiate Rhodesia have brought a perceptible change in Zambia's direction and policy.

Throughout most of 1975, Zambia openly supported UNITA. During the fall and winter, Zambia supported a coalition government of all three liberation groups. When it became apparent, however, that massive Soviet assistance and Cuban troops handed the MPLA a victory, Zambia did an abrupt switch; almost overnight, the state-controlled newspaper changed its attack from the Cubans and MPLA to their opponents.

Over the past few years, Kaunda has turned from hopes for a negotiated settlement on Rhodesia to support for armed struggle. He has thus adopted the position generally shared among Front-Line states and that long supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba. Kaunda welcomed ex-President Podgorny to Lusaka last March and during one toast drew a parallel between his ideological beliefs of "Humanism" and the principles of Leninism. Kaunda and Podgorny agreed to broaden economic, technical, and cultural cooperation between the two nations and to establish a direct Moscow-Lusaka air link.

Zambia relies upon the Soviet Union to equip its own army as well as that of ZANU. Kaunda has even hinted about possible Cuban involvement by saying on 8 July 1977, "We have alerted one or two countries for military aid...We have selected them and they are ready to come." Zambian officials said the President referred to Cuba and Somalia. While this may constitute a threat at present, it could develop into a reality should peaceful negotiations again fail and Rhodesian incursions into Zambian territory increase.

The Soviets in turn seem eager for greater involvement and influence in this important nation, traditionally suspicious of Moscow. The Kremlin dispatched its top Africanist and former Director of the African Institute in Moscow as its Ambassador to Zambia earlier this year.

5. Prospects

Partially because of geographical location and of deliberate governmental policy, Zambia's future is tied to that of Rhodesia. President Kaunda has repeatedly risked his international prestige and domestic support for majority rule as smoothly and quickly as possible. Zambia's economy as well as security is affected by the Rhodesian situation; before UDI in 1965, for example, over one-third of Zambia's imports came from Rhodesia.

In short, Kaunda needs a rapid settlement in Rhodesia. Should the transition become even more prolonged, then the Zambian economy will suffer further, its security be jeopardized, and the President's political support decline. Zambia's relations with the West will be strained even greater and its ties with the Soviets and possibly with the Cubans strengthened. Such developments are of course not irreversible. However, it may take years or decades for Zambia to return to economic health, political stability, regional security, and pro-Western stance should the present trends continue and the birth of Zimbabwe be a prolonged and bloody one.

III REGIONAL RELATIONS

Bilateral relations among the three states are either tense or hostile. Zambia does not have close relations with the other two states, and Zaire and Angola consider each other primary enemies.

Regional antagonisms grew out of the Angolan War. Zaire strongly backed FNLA and Zambia initially supported UNITA. Consequently, the successful MPLA faction had little cause for warm feelings towards either.

Since then the Katangan Invasion deepened the feelings of hostility between Zaire and Angola. Neto may have supported the invasion to rid the country of the refugees, who had lived there over sixteen years and developed into a military power in their own right; to force Zaire to stop assistance to UNITA, FNLA and Flec; or to prevent some anticipated Zairian move to seize Cabinda. Regardless of the motives, however, the MPLA government did provide important logistical support. Mobutu is unlikely to ever forget its assistance, since the attack came when his government was most vulnerable and nearly toppled the regime.

The invasion also caused a freeze in the previously cordial relationship between Zaire and Zambia. Mobutu was hurt that Kaunda indicated no support for his position and was furious when Kaunda made his first trip to Luanda in the midst of the "80 Day War." Zaire continues to deal with Zambia out of sheer necessity. It is through Zambia that the Shaba region receives nearly all its foodstuffs and imported goods. This economic relationship antagonizes Zambia, which profits little economically and is forced to cooperate in violating the international boycott of Rhodesia. Kaunda's own economy is badly hurt by honoring the boycott while Zaire uses the Zambian rail line to trade heavily with the Smith regime and South Africa.

Since the Katangan Invasion, Neto has kept up a drumbeat of criticism against Mobutu. On May Day he accused Zaire and South Africa of undermining his country and on 3 August 1977 gave a major address accusing Zaire of trying to seize Cabinda and of allowing the Germans to build "missile-launching ramps in the Kivu Region bordering on Angola that can transport...simple bombs or atomic warheads. Our main problem now, capping all others, is the problem of defense" of attack from Zaire.

Zambia's relations with Angola remain cool, despite diplomatic relations opening in April 1976 and joint membership as Front-Line states. Kaunda was shocked by the deterioration of Luanda and may figure that Neto does not have long to rule. Besides he maintains contact with Savimbi; his preference of the UNITA leader over that of the MPLA is apparent to Neto and others.

IV OUTSIDE POWERS

A. The Soviet Union

The Soviet Union has clearly increased its interest and involvement in Africa over the past few years. This was most apparent during the Angolan War when, for the first time, the Soviet Union and Cuba imposed a government against the wishes of the majority of the people in a distant area of no historical interest to either state.

Over the past four years, Soviet military deliveries to Africa have nearly doubled to \$1.07 billion in 1976, excluding the costs of military construction, training, technical assistance, and supply operations which would add another 10-20 percent. The equipment supplied has been far more sophisticated than previously seen on the continent. The number of Soviet military advisors in Africa has increased sevenfold since 1973.

Both the United States and China spend ten times more on economic than on military assistance to Africa. The Soviet Union has concentrated on military assistance and supplies an insignificant amount of economic assistance. It may prefer to offer military over economic aid because it yields quicker tangible results; creates contacts with influential military elites; generates dependence for training and spare parts; and fosters conflict, which often helps expand Soviet influence.

The long-range goals of the Soviet Union in Africa include: increasing overall influence and access, spreading Soviet ideology, curbing Western influence, posturing to be able to deny Western access to essential raw materials and shipping routes during time of crisis, and demonstrating its capacity as a reliable ally and effective superpower able to project power far from its shores.

Soviet grand strategy dictates that the USSR cannot create a revolution, just exploit a revolutionary situation. Hence the Soviet Union lay relatively low in Africa from the early 1960s until the Angolan War. Now, however, it portrays itself as the rising influence on the continent.

The Soviets naturally seek Marxist-Leninist regimes. In recent years the three African states of Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique have proclaimed themselves to be strict Marxist-Leninist allies. Previously, many African experts in the United States and elsewhere had considered Marxism an ideology totally alien to Africans and unacceptable on the continent.

Soviet military access in Africa is important for Soviet projection of power. All new Soviet overseas bases established since the early 1960s have been on the African continent, such as in Egypt, Somalia, and Guinea. The major factor, however, is Soviet access in time of crisis rather than the presence or absence of permanent bases themselves. The Kremlin's specific interest in military access to Angola has been explained on page 18, above.

Soviet measures in all of Africa bolster claims that the net correlation of forces is moving steadily in its direction. The Soviet press considered its actions during the Angolan War proof of its reliability as an ally and powerful state. The contrast to U.S. and Chinese actions in the crisis was implicit. Izvestia said on 26 December 1976 that by the Angolan operation, "African and other nonaligned countries have had an opportunity to see for themselves the groundlessness of the Maoist allegations." The Soviet Union demonstrated that its "international duty" to support wars of national liberation and "defend the interests of the peoples of young states" takes precedence over the "normalization of relations with the capitalistic states and the relaxation of international tension." Moscow acted dramatically in supporting the MPLA "no matter who insisted" that it abstain.

The same type of superpower arrogance came out during the Katangan Invasion. On 18 April 1977, Secretary Brezhnev declared that any "new and dangerous source of tensions in the center of Africa" would be "the entire responsibility" of the West. By supporting Zaire, Brezhnev claimed, the West "violated one of the basic principles of interstate relations--the principle of noninterference in domestic affairs." He temporarily forgot about the Cuban forces and massive Soviet assistance to neighboring Zaire when speaking of "attempts undertaken by imperialistic forces and their henchmen to interfere in the domestic military conflict in Zaire."

Obviously the Soviets cannot realize all their goals in Africa. They are handicapped by an often-irrelevant ideology, lack of economic assistance and of economic model in their own system, often inept diplomacy, and cultural aloofness. However, the Soviets have shown a patience in dealing with Africans--best seen in their relations with Guinea--and have profited substantially by the inability of the West to bring about successful resolutions to Africa's problems, the resulting armed conflicts, and Western reluctance to become heavily involved in times of crisis such as the Angolan War.

Moderate African states have expressed concern over growing Soviet and Cuban influence on the continent. Nineteen African Heads of State met in Dakar in April 1977 and voiced this very concern, with many advocating a joint defense force. At the recent OAU summit the same moderate Africans spoke out, something they refused to do last year. The chief Egyptian delegate struck a responsive chord when declaring, "The only issue that really matters here is that of Soviet interference in Africa." The Ivory Coast's President Houphouet-Boigny has accused the Soviet Union of taking "advantage of any confusion or chaos in Africa to infiltrate the continent." He maintains that the Russian goal is not to "liberate" the continent but to "sever the vital communication links between the highly industrialized West and the rich raw-material resources of Africa, thereby fatally weakening the Western economy." Such moderates

point out that since no black African state has an arms industry, each must rely upon outside assistance to help preserve its national security and resist unwelcomed outside influence.

B. Cuba

Castro has called Africa "the weakest link in the chain of imperialism" and has made good on his claim that Cuba is a "Latin African nation" as well as a "Latin American" one.

Cuba has aided "progressive" regimes in Africa since the early 1960s. It has established military missions in Ghana (1961), Zaire (1965), Congo-Brazzaville (1965), Guinea-Bissau (1966), Guinea (1966), Sierre Leone (1972), Equatorial Guinea (1973), Somalia (1974), Angola (1975), Ethiopia (1977), and Libya (1977). In October 1963, Cuban combat troops fought alongside Algerians against Morocco. In the spring of 1965, Che Guevara entered Zaire with a band of Cubans in order to spark a revolt. When he failed rather dismally, Cuba switched its attention to the colonial battles and first provided assistance to the MPLA in 1965.

Cuba is increasing its involvement in Africa, due in part to its inability to make "revolutionary" progress in Latin America. Cuba, which had under 400 troops in Africa in 1973, now has over 16,000. More than 5,000 Cuban civilians are in Angola alone. Cuba has diplomatic relations with 31 African states and military and scientific missions in nine nations.

This involvement is quite remarkable for a small island nation of 9 million on the other side of the Atlantic and one totally dependent on the Soviet Union for economic survival. Due to a slump in world sugar prices--from 50 cents a pound in 1974-1975 to 8 cents a pound in 1976--Cuba is more economically dependent on Moscow than ever. Over the past 15 years, the USSR has poured more than \$8 billion into Cuba. Politically Cuba is reliably pro-Soviet. It was the first nation to defend the 1968

Czechoslovakian Invasion and regularly extols the virtues of the Soviet system while blasting Peking. Cuba permits the Soviets the use of docking facilities, Cuenfogos submarine tendering complex, satellite tracking station, and refueling for its reconnaissance flights.

While Cuba and the Soviet Union certainly share an outlook on world problems, Cuba may be the primary advocate of an activist African policy. Che Guevara's missions to Africa in the mid-1960s did not seem to be supported or even approved by Moscow. In fact, such actions, which constituted Cuba's first significant involvement in Africa, came precisely at a low point of Moscow-Havana relations (caused by differences over Cuba's domestic policies and its actions in Latin America). Havana has steadily been involved in Africa whereas Moscow laid low between 1965 and 1975. These factors suggest that Cuba cannot be considered a mere "proxy" or pawn to Moscow's African policy. It has its own goals and revolutionary zeal with but scarce resources to realize its ambitions.

In some cases, Moscow may have even restrained Havana with its hold over the purse. The Soviet Union has refused to supply Cuba with long-distance military transport planes to enable it to achieve greater latitude. Though giving medium-range transport planes (AN-12s) to nations like India since the early 1960s, the Kremlin has denied such equipment to Cuba. Castro can use civil aircraft for lightly armed troops but must rely on sealift or turn to Moscow for airlift of heavy equipment during times of crisis.

Cuba will remain heavily involved on the African continent for the foreseeable future. Following Castro's criss-crossing tour last March, he dispatched his brother (First Vice-President) to Angola, his First Deputy Minister of the Interior to Libya, and his Minister of Foreign Affairs to Nigeria, Benin, and Zambia. Similar diplomatic ventures by Guevara in 1964-65 and Castro in 1972 presaged quantum leaps in Cuban military involvement in Africa with resources it was able to beg or borrow from the Soviet bloc. This may again happen over the coming year, should resources again be forthcoming.

However, important developments may be taking place in Castro's ties to Libya's Qadaffi. The two leaders may have agreed to a Cuban military training mission in Libya in exchange for a \$250 million loan to Cuba, repayable in sugar. Should such a relationship develop, Castro may gain the means of pursuing yet more drastic and adventuresome actions in Africa. Certainly Qadaffi would be less responsible and less cautious, were he to bankroll Castro's African policy, than the Kremlin.

Regardless of such moves, Washington has little leverage by which to curb Cuba's deep involvement in Africa. The establishment of partial or full diplomatic relations seems not to help influence Castro's behavior. It was during the first direct Havana-Washington diplomatic negotiations since the early 1960s that Castro launched the Angolan operation. Were he deeply concerned about U.S. reactions, he would not have embarked upon such a large-scale action at that delicate time.

C. China

China's role in Africa has risen along with its increased attention to world affairs following the Cultural Revolution. Peking's focus beyond Asia is clearly on Africa. Between 1970 and 1974, nearly two-thirds of its entire economic assistance has gone to black Africa, mostly to the Central states of Tanzania, Zambia and Zaire.

In recent years, China has changed its tactics from a long-range approach of helping any willing African state to a focus on nations most firmly anti-Soviet. China has held up Sudan as a model nation and Peking boosted its presence after President Numayri expelled Soviet advisors and reduced the size of the USSR Embassy.

Chinese diplomats also mention Egypt in their continual attempt to have African Heads of State condemn Soviet and Cuban expansion on the continent. The head Chinese delegate to the recent Apartheid Conference in Lagos asserted that the Soviet Union was "carrying out aggression and

expansion" on the continent "for flagrant encroachment upon the sovereignty and territorial integrity of independent African states" as part of a new "social imperialism." Other Chinese diplomats stress how Soviet actions in Africa are part of a plan for world domination by gaining access to vast natural resources and sea lanes. They accuse Moscow of dividing African states and using African allies "to serve as its cannon-fodder and colonialist tool."

The Chinese preoccupation with Soviet expansion now supersedes its attacks on capitalist expansion. This change is reflected on policies towards Zaire. In 1960 the PRC roundly condemned U.S. actions to preserve the territorial integrity of that country as "imperialism" and accused the UN peacekeeping operation of being a mere cover for U.S. armed intervention. In contrast, the Chinese applauded the 1977 French-Moroccan operation to preserve Zaire. During a UN Conference last May, the Chinese delegate accused the USSR of "instigating large numbers of mercenaries for a flagrant invasion of Zaire in serious encroachment upon the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Zaire." In Lagos the Chinese repeated the same line, speaking of the "brilliant victory won by the Zairian people" with the support of others "in smashing the invasion by socialist-imperialist hired mercenaries."

Limited Chinese resources, however, cannot match Soviet assistance in Africa. Peking has attempted to make a virtue of necessity by picturing itself as a nonwhite developing nation helping other nonwhite developing states. During its massive construction of the Tan-Zam Railroad, for example, China said that sending its experts to Africa delayed important work on its own railroad lines.

China has gained influence in Africa through its effective and timely aid program. Each phase of the five-year \$500 million railroad project was completed on time, unlike most projects in Africa. Its small agricultural projects have been successful and its interest-free liberal-repayment loans are quite popular.

Still Peking has not found smooth sailing on the continent. Chinese leaders feel disappointed by Mozambique which they supported heavily before independence but which has since turned almost exclusively to Moscow, by Tanzania in which China poured the most assistance and advisors without much political benefit, and by Zambia where China has given extensive assistance only to find Lusaka backing the Soviet-allied liberation forces of ZANU.

China's policies in Africa can be analyzed in terms of the worldwide Sino-Soviet rivalry, as African experts such as Colin Legum have convincingly done. However, this explanation offers little consolation to U.S. policymakers or moderate African regimes concerned with the spread of Soviet influence. Chinese moves on the continent may, in fact, have spurred the USSR to take more action there. Without the additional impetus of the Sino-Soviet rivalry in Angola and Mozambique, for two examples, the Kremlin may have been less willing to have become so deeply involved.

While American and Chinese interests in Africa converge on the key goal of limiting Soviet influence and Cuban presence, there are still serious differences. The Chinese have opposed a negotiated settlement of the problems in southern Africa and frequently criticize Western policies in South Africa. Besides, the Chinese have shown themselves to be "paper tigers" during the Angolan Civil War. Their important and sizable assistance to the FNLA evaporated when most needed, as the conflict erupted.

This would lead U.S. policymakers to retain a cordial stance towards Chinese policies on the continent but to pursue their own interests and actions regardless of Peking's wishes. It is important to remember that the identical words used by the Chinese now to pressure Americans to restrain Soviet expansion were taken from the 1950s and early 1960s when the Chinese were pressuring the Soviets to restrain American actions.

States should give Mobutu every opportunity to show his sincerity during this important period. Washington should not give up hope for improvement in the potentially wealthy state, which has maintained internal order for the past decade, has supported U.S. positions on important international issues, and is currently politically stable.

2. Despite whatever international assistance is provided, however, DoD planners should be aware that Zaire probably would not be able to provide for its own security against a large-scale invasion, whether conventional or guerrilla, from Angola in the near future. It can and has handled small-scale incursions (one last July) but not any determined effort on a substantial level.

3. DoD officials can plan now for U.S. policies should another large Katangan Invasion occur, perhaps within a year. There is a high enough probability of a conventional or, more likely, the start of a guerrilla campaign to draw up alternative U.S. plans. These could include the type of material assistance most needed and available, means of transporting the material, and the type of communications and intelligence services most helpful to Zaire's command structure. The Department could also begin quietly sounding out Congressional leaders as to the nature of the American response which would be permitted and perhaps even supported on Capitol Hill.

4. Should such an invasion reoccur, the Department could not anticipate a repetition of the former French-Moroccan rescue operation. The French elections may cause greater caution in Paris, and operations like that undertaken last May are rarely repeated in the same manner.

In the absence of allies providing all the necessary help, Department officials could recommend a rapid, low-cost, and low-risk operation. The timing and manner of such assistance in this type of politico-military activity might be more important than its military value per se. Were Congressional approval obtained, such an operation

could: help secure Zaire, improve America's image among moderate African states worried about Soviet-Cuban expansionism, and symbolize a rejuvenation of U.S. foreign policy after Vietnam, the Angolan War, and the CIA revelations.

5. DoD officials should work closely with the State Department and National Security Council staff to assure a joint Executive Branch position on military assistance. This position should be carefully presented to Congress before any public announcements are made. Presidential statements of U.S. willingness to provide military assistance made and then not carried out--as happened with Angola in the past Administration and Somalia in the current Administration--invariably leave relations worse off and reinforce the impression of a divided and weak U.S. foreign policymaking system.

6. American planners and strategists should realize that the Soviets would most probably have military access in Angola during times of crisis. Should Luanda prove reluctant, the Soviet Union could provide pressure directly or indirectly through Havana, which most certainly could arrange for Soviet use of air and port facilities for projection of power. As discussed on pages 18 and 19 above, this could prove crucial to Moscow for: South Atlantic surveillance, contingencies within Namibia, contingencies between Namibia and South Africa, or the application of pressure on crucial Western oil shipments in times of crisis or conditions between general peace and total conflict. As discussed on page 17, this type of military access can prove crucial to projection of Soviet power regardless of the presence or absence of established bases.

7. DoD policymakers can best assist moderation in Zambia by fostering the State Department in its efforts to advance reasonable proposals for an acceptable political settlement in Rhodesia. As discussed on pages 23 and 24 above, Zambia needs a Rhodesian settlement for economic recovery, political cohesion, national security and a moderate world outlook.

Peaceful settlement of the transition in Rhodesia would also help economic conditions in Zaire, which depends heavily upon a prosperous Rhodesia for foodstuffs, transportation facilities, and equipment for the Shaba Region.

8. The rising importance of Africa in world affairs should be reflected within the Department of Defense. Between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, Africa assumed the lowest priority in U.S. security considerations. The demise of the Portuguese colonial empire in 1974, the Angolan Civil War in 1975, the increased conflict in the Horn beginning in 1976, the Katangan Invasion and widening guerrilla conflict in Rhodesia in 1977, and the anticipated black rule of Namibia and Zimbabwe in 1978--all have raised security interests in Africa.

Present staffing patterns within the Pentagon and the importance assigned to African nations in OSD and JCS evaluations often reflect a past era when U.S. security interests and involvement on the continent were minimal. The problems of African nations, both black and white, will increasingly involve key issues which the United States must address and important problems of security as well as diplomacy.

B. Findings for the U.S. Government

1. U.S. policymakers should realize that moderate African leaders question the political will and reliability of the United States at this time. After U.S. withdrawals from Vietnam and Angola and limited assistance during the Katangan Invasion, leaders in Senegal, Ivory Coast, Kenya and Chad, as well as Zaire, are fearful that the Soviets and Cubans are proving far more effective and reliable extracontinental friends.

Many African leaders are somewhat reassured by the direct U.S. role in furthering black rule for Zimbabwe and Namibia.

Those Americans in Congress, the Executive Departments, and general public who advocate strong actions against white rule in southern Africa should also appreciate the occasional need for direct U.S. action in black Africa during times of crisis. It seems inconsistent to proclaim the general principle of "African solutions to African problems" exclusive of U.S. involvement from the Sahel to the Zambeze River and urge more forceful U.S. actions in the southern region. Though the emotionally laden issue of racism may be absent in black Africa, the vitally important issue of national security does arise for African leaders with traditional ties to the West who may look to Washington for assistance in preserving the territorial integrity of their states.

A passive U.S. stance on security issues in black Africa runs the risk of increasing Soviet and Cuban involvement in these areas. While perhaps likely to fail to meet their objectives in the long run, Moscow and Havana can cause serious problems in the short and medium time frame. The Soviets were eventually blocked in access to the Middle East, for example, but their presence between the mid-1950s and mid-1970s did fuel three serious conflicts.

Increased Soviet presence in black Africa would foster hostility towards peaceful resolution of conflicts. The new OAU President, Gabon's Omar Bongo, has attacked "Soviet imperialism" as "a cause of tension in Africa." Greater Soviet influence also damages harmonious relations with the West in international organizations and basic respect for human rights. Moscow's principal allies on the continent--Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, and Guinea--are the worst offenders of human rights. They are also the states with the least economic growth and among the worst living conditions for their people. On the other hand, Western-leaning states--such as Kenya, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Botswana, and Swaziland--have the best records on supporting peaceful solutions to problems, furthering economic development and growth, and fostering human rights. On the basis of recent experience, therefore, one can conclude that growing Soviet and Cuban influence in particular African

states results in conditions basically opposed to U.S. goals for national security, economic prosperity, respect for human rights, and peaceful resolution of problems on the continent.

2. The United States should continue to provide high visibility support for the IMF stabilization program in Zaire and other measures, such as private bank support and development assistance, which help alleviate Zaire's dire economic situation. The U.S. can operate on the premise that Mobutu will remain leader of Zaire for the foreseeable future. International policies involving moderate African nations will often require his participation and be bolstered by his support. Domestic policies to help the long-suffering populace can best be furthered by our direct involvement as long as Mobutu remains on the right track towards economic, military and political reform. Greater care should be devoted on Capitol Hill to explaining Zaire's past help and current determination to improve its domestic conditions. Mobutu's regime is certainly moving in the proper direction and his errors, no matter how foolish, should not blind us to present reforms and future possibilities.

3. The U.S. Government should realize that full recognition of Angola will be perceived as bolstering Neto's position and undermining that of UNITA and other resistance movements. The current Luanda regime's record on international issues and human rights, total dependence on extracontinental forces to maintain its leaders in power and to operate virtually all governmental institutions, and formal embracing of Marxism-Leninism make the Neto government rather unappealing to our values and goals in Africa.

4. U.S. policymakers, rather than emphasizing any "stabilizing role" of the Cubans in Angola, should stress their occupational role. Major pronouncements should be made showing the inconsistency of Castro--who with Che Guevara glorified guerrilla movements with popular rural support battling a corrupt, harsh, unpopular government--now finding himself fighting just such a movement to shore up a puppet regime. As

Ivory Coast President Houphouet-Boigny said, "In less than two years" the Cubans "have killed thousands of Angolans--our African brothers, murdered in cold blood. More victims fell in this short period than in the 15 years of guerrilla war against Portuguese colonialism. Yet the West rarely notes this gruesome reality."

5. U.S. intelligence agencies, including DIA, should closely monitor future ties between Libya and Cuba. If this relationship develops into a close association, policymakers can expect more adventuresome and, to our viewpoint, troublesome Cuban presence and actions on the continent.

6. U.S. decisionmakers should not expect a warming of bilateral relation with Cuba to affect Cuban actions in Africa or to discourage Cuban presence or vigor on the continent. Castro demonstrated disregard for U.S. opinion in the midst of serious U.S.-Cuban negotiations when he dispatched some 15,000 troops to Angola.

7. U.S. policies in Africa must be carefully considered on their own merit, regardless of pressures from China. While U.S.-Chinese interests converge on a concern of Soviet and Cuban expansion in Africa, they still differ in fundamental ways. A primary Chinese goal is to spur the United States to take actions that Peking itself is either unable or unwilling to take, as demonstrated during the Angolan War. U.S. policymakers should avoid any such pressures and come to their own independent evaluation of U.S. strategic, economic, and political interests in Central Africa and throughout the continent.